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PREMISE

Any democratic judicial system must be built on the principle of due
process, the fountain from which all procedural rules and doctrines
flourish. The principle carries with it the ideas of fairness, reasonableness,
and efficiency, all to be measured, balanced, and applied to the various,
changing circumstances that confront a judicial system in a democracy.
The idea of balance is essential to due process. As Justice Harlan
observed:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can
be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has
represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of
content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have
felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which
it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which
builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could
serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.1

What Justice Harlan said more than half a century ago is still true
today. Due process has not been codified and cannot be reduced to a onesize-fit-all formula. Rather, it calls for a careful consideration of a range
of factors pertaining to fairness and reasonableness, and a careful
balancing among the various conflicting interests of the parties and
institutions directly and indirectly involved.
Understanding the scope and contours of due process is thus crucial
to the development of procedural and substantive rules that could achieve
the optimal results in a democratic system. Yet the scholarly articles
entirely devoted to the topic are scarce to say the least,2 and most of the
1 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment
could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought
is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for
inanimate machines and not for judges”).
2 See, e.g., Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).
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relevant monographs3 have not articulated a theory of due process, but
largely provide an historical overview or a survey of the rights that are
commonly understood as due process rights.
A theory of due process is missing and this deficiency has, in my
opinion, contributed to the lack of a true understanding and, thus, truthful,
real investment of the system in the principle.
An article cannot do justice to the complexities and depth of the due
process principle. But there are some ideas and insights I thought I might
share here, to start defining the theory of procedural due process, and
prompt deeper judicial investigation and scholarship on the topic.
I want to emphasize at the outset that my study focuses on civil
procedural due process only, that is, it focuses only on the principle to
which civil procedure rules and doctrines should conform to avoid unfair
and unreasonable deprivations of liberty or property.
Even if I believe that the fairness and reasonableness that the due
process principle aims to achieve do not inherently demand any artificial
separation between substantive and procedural law,4 I will limit myself to
articulating a theory of procedural due process, given that my area of
expertise is procedural law. I am confident, though, that the theory here
articulated will offer valuable support to those interested in exploring more
deeply the idea of substantive due process and that, when applied to
substantive due process, this theory will not require significant alterations.
Part II of my study unearths the core of procedural due process
through the relevant U.S. Supreme Court opinions and commentaries on
the topic. Part III tests some procedural rules and doctrines against the
theory as articulated in Part II, showing where those rules and doctrines
are not truthful to due process. The due process theory is here revisited in
view of this part’s findings. Part IV shows how the procedural rules and

3 See, e.g., SULLIVAN MASSARO, THE ARCH OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2013); JOHN V ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY
(2003); ALFRED THOMPSON DENNING, BARON, THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW (2003); VIRGINIA
WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, 1932-1949: THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL TOOL (1972); RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A HISTORICAL
AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS
IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE LAND” (1926); TAYLOR HANNIS,
DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS: A TREATISE BASED, IN
THE MAIN, ON THE BASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS
GRANTED OR DENIED RELIEF UPON THE ONE GROUND OR THE OTHER (1917); LUCIUS POLK
MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1906).
4 However, concurring in Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 772
(2005), Justice Souter suggested that collapsing substantive law and procedure would be
inappropriate (Gonzales’s claim would thus take us beyond Roth or any other recognized
theory of Fourteenth Amendment due process, by collapsing the distinction between
property protected and the process that protects it.”).
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doctrines examined in Part III affect the development of substantive law.
And Part V offers my concluding remarks.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I’ll start from the basics. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution provide, respectively, that the federal government
and the states shall not deprive any individual of life, liberty, or property
without “due process of law.” A law whose content impairs a liberty or
property interest without a sufficient reason or justification will violate
substantive due process rights. A law that is enforced through an unfair
process that impairs a liberty or property interest will violate procedural
due process rights.5 In other words, a substantive law or procedural law
that is not supported by logic, fairness, and efficiency considerations, one
that has no reason other than to deprive the individual of life, liberty, or
property, one that doesn’t serve any individual or societal interest, violates
due process.
Viewed in these terms, there seems to be no meaningful distinction
between procedural and substantive due process. And, in fact, no such
distinction originally defined due process. The distinction was rather a
product of that separation of procedure and substantive law that came with
the demise of the original writs and forms of action6 and, more generally,
with civilization and the development of a substantive law that was finally
able to stand on its own footing.7
Originally the plaintiff’s claim was probably conceived just as a
component of the procedure, the process within which substantive law
5 See ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER MAY, AND SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 175 (7th ed. 2016).
6 THEODORE F. T. PLUCHNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 5th ed., at
381–82 (1956).
7 See id., at 381. Pluchnett observed that the “power to think of law apart from its
procedure . . . naturally can only develop when civilization has reached a mature stage”
and that this doesn’t happen if “the law [is] not yet strong enough to stand alone, for
obscurity rather than clarity.” Id. The “first comprehensive attempt to state (as far as was
then possible) the whole of English law in the form of substantive rules” came with the
Blackstone’s commentaries. Id.
Pluchnett added that
[t]he procedure was still there, however; in fact, the law was still entangled in
it, and Blackstone’s venture could be plausibly dismissed by conservatives as
a mere literary device. In the course of the succeeding century the great
revolution took place. With the abolition of forms of action and the unification
of courts and procedure, it became possible for law to flow more freely and
to escape the confinement of the old procedural categories. Only then did it
become possible to consider the law in practice as being the application of
substantive, rather than procedural, rules.
Id. at 382.
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develops. It then became clear that procedure was “a means to an end,”8
the end of enforcing substantive rights, and a science of procedure
developed to identify “the quickest, cheapest and most reliable methods of
organizing the practice side of the law,”9 that is, dispute-resolution
methods that would be consistent with due process.
The science of procedure has progressed over the years. And yet
sometimes procedural rules and doctrines disserve logic and the
democratic aspirations, and they don’t offer the quickest, cheapest, and
most reliable means and methods of enforcing substantive rights.
I have written about some of those rules and doctrines and, there,
have complained about their flaws,10 attributing such flaws to a
mechanical, check-list type of drafting and/or interpretation, as well as to
case management concerns dominating and ultimately infecting the
analysis. The legislature and the federal judiciary, though, seem to
welcome the mechanical/check-list approach as a method that provides
guidance, and they do not necessarily attribute their choices to workload
concerns.
It is sometimes hard to identify the reasons behind specific legislative
or judicial choices of analysis or outcomes that disserve due process and
democracy.11 We scholars make hypotheses, assumptions. Why, for
example, are Rules 2312 and 2613 written in a code/check-list style which
makes them so different from the other Rules? Why did the Gunn14 Court
find that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
malpractice claim arising out of patent law? Why did the McIntyre15 Court
find that there was no personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim who
had been injured by the defendant’s machine sold to a resident of the forum
state? Why did the Linda R.S.16 Court or the Clapper17 Court find that the
plaintiffs in both cases had no standing? Why did the Iqbal18 Court find

8

Id.
Id.
10 See, e.g., Simona Grossi, The Claim, __ HOUS. L. REV. __ (2017); Frontloading,
Class Actions, and a Proposal for a New Rule 23, __LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. __ (2017);
Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit, 47 AKRON L. REV. 617 (2014);
Forum Non Conveniens as a Jurisdictional Doctrine, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2013); A
Modified Theory of the Law of Federal Courts: The Case of Arising Under Jurisdiction,
88 WASH. L. REV. 3 (2013).
11 Simona Grossi, The Courts and the People, _NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE _ (2017).
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
14 Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
15 J. McIntyre Machinery, LTD. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
16 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
17 Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
9
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that the plaintiff’s claim of unlawful intentional discrimination against
federal officials was not plausible?
We speculate. We make hypotheses. The code/check-list style of
Rule 23 might be intended to provide more guidance to judges and
lawyers, to help them cope with the complexities of modern class actions.
Or perhaps it might be intended to restrain judicial discretion—the more
items to check on a list, the less room for judicial discretion and case-bycase assessment of the needs of the case.19 Analogous hypotheses could
be made for Rule 26, and one could add that the check-list approach is
there intended to contain the breadth and costs of discovery.20
As for the judicial opinions, it might have been case management
concerns that led the Gunn Court to find no subject matter jurisdiction in
that case.21 It was perhaps comity concerns and concerns for international
relations that suggested the McIntyre outcome.22 Federalism concerns
might have led to the standing analysis in Linda R.S.23 In Clapper, the
outcome might have been generated by the “special framework”24 of the
national security context. And it was 9/11 that suggested the adoption of
a strict pleading approach in Iqbal, one that would apply across a wide
range of cases, though, not just to sensitive national security cases.25
But what if instead of, or in addition to the above political reasons,
some of the above legislative and judicial choices had been caused by a
misunderstanding of the principle of due process and its true content?
What if the legislature and federal judges were genuinely trying to draft
rules and offer interpretations that they considered in service of the fair
and efficient administration of justice? What if the problem was to be
attributed to a misunderstanding of due process and the balance of
conflicting interests and needs that the principle requires? I did consider
the possibility that mine was just an exorbitant hypothesis. Of course,
everyone knows what due process is. Everyone should know what it is
and what it entails.
This thought has essentially kept me from writing this article for
several years. And yet I never abandoned the idea. I continued to observe,
read the signals, ponder.
My audience sometimes resisted when I described the plaintiffs’
right to have access to justice and the plaintiff’s reliance on the availability

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Simona Grossi, Frontloading, supra note 10.
Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra note 10.
Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory, supra note 10.
Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 10.
Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra note 10.
Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
Id.
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of a forum as due process rights. The plaintiffs’ due process rights are
more clearly identifiable when we talk about class actions and absent
plaintiffs that might be bound by a judgment to the rendition of which they
have not participated.26 But those rights become less evident when we talk
about personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, justiciability,
abstention, pleadings, discovery, etc. It is the defendant who is dragged
into court. The defendant is the one we need to take care of. But what
about the plaintiff?27 Where does the plaintiff stand in the analysis?
Doesn’t due process demand consideration of the plaintiff’s rights too?
The plaintiff’s reliance and expectations? And how should we balance the
conflicting interests? Would formalism (law discovery) or realism (law
creation), or a combination of the two, serve due process better? If it’s a
combination, a balance of the two and the conflicting interests at stake,
how should we balance?
This journey into procedural due process is intended to help in
answering the above questions. It will shed more light into the content and
contours of the principle, suggest a method to draw the optimal balance
between the conflicting interests at stake, and ultimately develop a theory
of procedural due process against which to assess procedural rules and
doctrines.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the
principle of due process. In Kerry v. Din,28 the Court noted that
[t]he Due Process Clause has its origin in Magna Carta. As
originally drafted, the Great Charter provided that “[n]o freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any
otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn

26 The mechanisms of Rule 23 are intended, among other things, to protect those very
rights. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:5 (5th ed. 2014) (“Rule 23 is construed to
ensure that the representative nature of class action litigation safeguards these absent class
members’ due process rights.”).
27 As Frank I. Michelman noted,
a denial of fair procedure to a civil plaintiff comes within the traditional due
process concern about injurious treatment of individuals by the state, just
insofar as we see the state’s failure to protect the plaintiff’s interests against
the defendant’s encroachments as itself a form of injury. Such is the SOCIAL
COMPACT view according to which persons entering political association
surrender to the state the use of force, for the safer protection of their several
“lives, liberties, and estates.” The state’s regime of law and order then
overrides the natural liberty of self-help, but only by replacing it with the
state’s obligation to protect.
Frank I. Michelman, in LEONARD W. LEVY AND KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, Vol. 4, 2029 (2nd ed. 2000).
28 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
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him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land.”29

In 1354, under Edward III, Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta was
revised and the new provision for the first time contained the phrase “due
process.”30 At that time, the phrase was associated with a series of
protections inherent in the trial process, like trial by jury,31 and as the Court
later explained, at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification, the
words “due process of law” were understood “to convey the same
meaning as the words ’by the law of the land’” in Magna Carta.32 Of
course, since the founding, “the amount and quality of process that our
precedents have recognized as ‘due’ under the Clause has changed
considerably.”33
At the beginning, the Magna Carta “law of the land” meant, at the
very least, that a person could not be deprived of liberty or property except
pursuant to established law. In other words, the “law of the land” imposed
a rule of law principle.

29 Id. at 2132 (quoting Magna Carta, ch. 29, in 1 E. Coke, The Second Part of the
Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (1797) (emphasis added)).
30 LEONARD W. LEVY & KENNETH L. KARST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, Vol. II, at 828 (2002) (“A 1354 act of Parliament reconfirming MAGNA
CARTA paraphrased its chapter 29 as follows: ‘That no man . . . shall be put out of Land
or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in Answer by due Process of Law.’ This was the first reference to due process in
English legal history. Chapter 29 of the 1225 issue of Magna Carta originally concluded
with the phrase ‘by the LAW OF THE LAND.’”) (emphasis in original).
31 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044,
1048 (1984) (“Well before our Constitution was drafted, British jurists had definitively
associated this phrase with a variety of protections inherent in the trial process, most
notably trial by jury. The framers of the fifth amendment could not have doubted that the
due process concept included such protections, whatever they may have thought about its
effect on substantive legislation. The framers of the fourteenth amendment were certainly
of the same view. The extent to which the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause was
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights may be disputed, but it was at least intended to
incorporate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. And no subsequent
interpretation of either provision has seriously called its applicability to judicial trials into
question.”).
32 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856); see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 663 (1833) (“Lord
Coke says, that these latter words, per legem terrae (by the law of the land,) mean by due
process of law, that is, without due presentment or indictment, and being brought in to
answer thereto by due process of the common law.”) It is true that the phrase “due process
of law” technically referred to writs and forms of the law (process), but writs and forms
defined the content of the law of the land. Cf. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 8795 (1973) (emphasizing the “process” aspect of the phrase, but failing to see the
relationship between process and substantive law).
33 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28–36 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring
in judgment).
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The phrase “due process of law” then translated the law-of-the-land
standard into a practical formula requiring the use of the appropriate
(“due”) writ or form (“process of law”) in any act of potential deprivation.
The required “process of law” reflected both the substantive and
procedural components of the established law, drawing no distinction
between the two. In short, all potential deprivations ought to proceed
according to the process that encompassed the substantive standard. The
due process standard, therefore, prohibited the King from imposing
arbitrary deprivations on his subjects. Logically, it followed, a law that
vested the King with arbitrary power would be invalid as inconsistent with
the rule-of-law premise of due process. In short, to comply with due
process an action ought to accord with an established, non-arbitrary
standard of law.
A. Procedural Due Process: The Path Traced by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Opinions
After the Magna Carta, the scope of “due process” continued to
evolve, and the phrase appears in literally thousands of Supreme Court
opinions.
In many of those opinions, the phrase operates as nothing more than
a passing reference; in others, it plays a pivotal role in the resolution of the
controversy before the Court. A good many of the cases in that latter group
address the scope of procedural due process. No single opinion, though,
offers a clear statement of the theory of procedural due process.
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. stands as the
Court’s first foray into the law of procedural due process.34 At issue in
that case was the constitutionality of a distress warrant issued by the
Department of Treasury to secure property purchased by a customs
collector who had allegedly used funds embezzled from the Treasury to
purchase the property. The seizure was not preceded by notice or any form
of hearing or judicial sanction, but was purely an exercise of executive
authority undertaken pursuant to a federal statute that authorized the
issuance of such warrants. The Hoboken Court upheld the executive
action as consistent with due process.
The Court opened its due process analysis by observing that “[t]he
words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna Charta.

34

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
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Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,) says they mean
due process of law.”35
The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of those phrases, and
endorsed a mechanical method of analysis, which was one large step
removed from the principle:
The constitution contains no description of those processes which
it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what
principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it be due
process . . . . To what principles, then, are we to resort to ascertain
whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process? To this
the answer must be twofold. We must examine the constitution
itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its
provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and
which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and
political condition by having been acted on by them after the
settlement of this country.36

The Hoboken Court’s method of judicial inquiry—relying
exclusively on constitutional text and tradition—suggested that due
process required nothing more than a pedigree of past practices. Indeed,
the Court upheld the non-judicial issuance of the distress warrant based
solely on its view that the Treasury had acted in conformity with a statute
(law of the land) and that the statute found its roots in XVIII century
practices by the Crown (due process).37
Even less enlightening was the Court’s circular approach in Walker
v. Sauvinet,38 where the Court rejected defendant’s argument that due
process entitled him to a jury trial in a civil proceeding by observing that
[d]ue process of law is process due according to the law of the
land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the State.
Our power over that law is only to determine whether it is in
conflict with the supreme law of the land . . . . Art. 6 Const. Here
the State court has decided that the proceeding below was in
accordance with the law of the State; and we do not find that to be
contrary to the Constitution, or any law or treaty of the United
States.39

35 Id. at 276. This was also the view endorsed by Justice Joseph Story in his influential
treatise on the Constitution. STORY, COMMENTARIES, supra note 32, at 663.
36 Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276–77.
37 Id. at 276–79.
38 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
39 Id. at 93.
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In Hurtado v. California, 40 a case involving procedure in a criminal
case, the Court seemed to endorse a slightly more expansive (and perhaps
more theoretical) approach to due process. There it quoted, with approval,
Justice William Johnson’s views:
As to the words from Magna Charta . . . after volumes spoken and
written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind
has at last settled down to this: that they were intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
right and distributive justice.41

And those of Thomas Cooley:
The principles, then, upon which the process is based, are to
determine whether it is ‘due process’ or not, and not any
considerations of mere form. Administrative and remedial process
may be changed from time to time, but only with due regard to the
landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. 42

Arguably, the statements of Johnson and Cooley locate the principle
of due process in a non-formalistic prescription against arbitrary laws and
abjure considerations of mere form. But what the Hurtado Court may have
given with one hand, it withdrew with another:
The real syllabus of the passage quoted is that a process of law,
which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due process
of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England
and in this country; but it by no means follows, that nothing else
can be due process of law . . . . But to hold that such a
characteristic is essential to due process of law, would be to deny
every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the
Medes and Persians.43

Thus, the Court recognized that novel procedures could be deemed
due process, but adhered to the view that established practices remained
sufficient. In short, the right to due process remained grounded in past
practices, though the Court was willing to recognize deviations from those
past practices as constituting due process under appropriate circumstances.
The Court’s methodological and non-theoretical approach to
procedural due process continued into the early twentieth century, and is
40
41
42
43

110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Id. at 527 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 234, 244 (1819)).
Id. at 527–29.
Id.
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aptly exemplified by its decision in Twining v. New Jersey.44 There the
Court described a triumvirate of standards that controlled its due process
jurisprudence:
First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an
examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings
existing in the common and statute law of England before the
emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country . . . .
Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in
English law at the time of the emigration, and brought to this
country and practiced by our ancestors, is an essential element of
due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half
of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American
jurisprudence like a straight jacket, only to be unloosed by
constitutional amendment . . . .
Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no
change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those
fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by
judicial action, which have relation to process of law, and protect
the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary
action of government.45

In short, “settled usages” were sufficient but not necessary to due
process. Applying this method, the Court concluded that the principle of
self-incrimination was not a necessary settled usage within the meaning of
the due process clause. The “plus” of both Hurtado and Twining was the
Court’s recognition that due process was meant to prevent arbitrary
government action.
It is perhaps ironic that three years prior to the Court’s decision in
Twining, the Court had enforced an expansive version of substantive due
process in Lochner v. New York.46 There the Court found that New York’s
maximum work week hour requirement was “an unreasonable,
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to
his personal liberty.”47 The Court’s opinion, however, was less about a
theory of due process than it was about a theory of economics.48
The two most important procedural due process cases of the first half
of the XX century were undoubtedly International Shoe Co. v.
44
45
46
47
48

211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 100–01.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 56, 62.
Id. at 74–75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Washington49 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.50 Both
cases followed the established due process model of validating novel
practices that did not have the pedigree of settled usage, but they also
offered more of a window into the meaning of due process. International
Shoe’s reference to “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”
gave prime importance to fairness and reasonableness,51 while Mullane
cast the due process inquiry as a balance between the interests of the state
and the interests of the individual:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections The notice must be of such
nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it
must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the
constitutional requirements are satisfied. “The criterion is not the
possibility of conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable
character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with
which the statute deals.”
....
But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process. The means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on
the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those
affected, or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such
notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring
home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.52

Thus, Mullane and International Shoe gave us a sense that the core of
procedural due process is some combination of fairness and
reasonableness that requires a balancing between the interests of the state
and the individual.53

49

326 U.S. 310 (1950).
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
51 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
52 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted).
53 See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
(due process requires balancing of liberty interests against relevant state interests).
50
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Shortly after the decision in Mullane, the Court added some
independent weight to the idea of fairness when, in Bolling v. Sharpe,54 a
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,55 the Court observed that
[w]e have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal
protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process.56

This broader sense of fairness is also reflected in Justice Harlan’s
dissent from Poe v. Ullman, and in the modern Court’s overall
jurisprudence of substantive due process, where fairness becomes a
product of the liberty interest at stake and arbitrariness is measured in light
of the weight to be given that liberty interest.57
These essential components of due process analysis—fairness,
reasonableness, and balancing—remain the core features of procedural
due process. The balancing aspect of due process methodology is also
well established and reflected in Mathews v. Eldridge:58
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.59

54

347 U.S. 497 (1954).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–99.
57 ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 78-131 (7th ed 2016).
58 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
59 Id. at 334–45.
55
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A wide range of decisions incorporates these features through a caseby-case, context-specific assessment of due process. What emerges is a
collection of platitudes, rules with exceptions, and a somewhat ad hoc and
inconsistent applications of the variable standards of fairness and
reasonableness. Here is a broad sampling of recent decisions.
Ingraham v. Wright:60
“[T]he range of interests protected by procedural due process is not
infinite.” We have repeatedly rejected “the notion that any grievous loss
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause.” Due process is required only
when a decision of the State implicates an interest within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. And “to determine whether due process
requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the ‘weight’ but
to the nature of the interest at stake.”61
O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center:62
Procedural due process seeks to ensure the accurate determination of
decisional facts, and informed unbiased exercises of official discretion.63
Davis v. Scherer:64
Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment . . . . This Court consistently has held
that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally
deprived of a property interest. The ‘right to be heard before being
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may
not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society.’ The fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.’65

Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors:66
[T]he very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the
fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the
result
obtained
in
any
individual
case;
rather,
“procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

430 U.S. 651 (1977).
Id. at 672.
447 U.S. 773 (1980).
Id. at 797.
468 U.S. 183 (1984).
Id. at 202 (quoting Justice Powell in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332–33).
473 U.S. 305 (1985).
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inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of
cases, not the rare exceptions.”67

Dowling v. U.S.:68
Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the
Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have defined
the category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” very
narrowly. As we observed in Lovasco . . .
”Judges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law
enforcement officials [their] ‘personal and private notions’ of
fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their
judicial function.’ . . . . [They] are to determine only whether the
action complained of . . . violates those ‘fundamental conceptions
of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s sense of fair play
and decency’.”69

Zinermon v. Burch:70
First, the [Due Process] Clause incorporates many of the specific
protections defined in the Bill of Rights . . . . Second, the Due
Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions “regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them.” . . .
The Due Process Clause also encompasses a third type of
protection, a guarantee of fair procedure . . . . In procedural due
process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally
protected interest in “life, liberty, or property” is not in itself
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of
such an interest without due process of law. (“Procedural due
process rules are meant to protect persons not from the
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of
life, liberty, or property”) . . . . Therefore, to determine whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what
process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally
adequate. This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards
built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting the
deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations provided
by statute or tort law.
....

67
68
69
70

Id. at 321 (internal citations omitted).
493 U.S. 342 (1990).
Id. at 352–53 (internal citations omitted).
494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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Due process, as this Court often has said, is a flexible concept that
varies with the particular situation. To determine what procedural
protections the Constitution requires in a particular case, we weigh
several factors:
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
Applying this test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution
requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person
of liberty or property [and] “some kind of notice . . . . In some
circumstances, however, the Court has held that a statutory
provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common-law tort
remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.71

Justice Scalia concurring in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip:72
[O]ur due process opinions in recent decades have
indiscriminately applied balancing analysis to determine
“fundamental fairness,” without regard to whether the procedure
under challenge was (1) a traditional one and, if so, (2) prohibited
by the Bill of Rights. Even so, however, very few cases have used
the Due Process Clause, without the benefit of an accompanying
bill of Rights guarantee, to strike down a procedure concededly
approved by traditional and continuing American practice. Most
notably, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395
U.S. 337, 340 (1969), over the strenuous dissent of Justice Black,
the Court declared unconstitutional the garnishment of wages,
saying that “the fact that a procedure would pass muster under a
feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection to all
property in its modern forms.” And in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977), the Court invalidated general quasi in rem jurisdiction,
saying that “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’
can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures
that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional
heritage,” id. at 212. Such cases, at least in their broad

71
72

Id. at 125–28.
499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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pronouncements if not with respect to the particular provisions at
issue, were in my view wrongly decided.73

Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg:74
Because the basic procedural protections of the common law have
been regarded as so fundamental, very few cases have arisen in
which a party has complained of their denial. In fact, most of our
due process decisions involve arguments that traditional
procedures provide too little protection and that additional
safeguards are necessary to ensure compliance with the
Constitution. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Burnham v.
Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604 (1990);
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Nevertheless, there are a handful of cases in which a party has been
deprived of liberty or property without the safeguards of commonlaw procedure. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) . . . . When the absent
procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary and
inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the
proceedings violative of due process. Of course, not all deviations
from established procedures result in constitutional infirmity. As
the Court noted in Hurtado, to hold all procedural change
unconstitutional “would be to deny every quality of the law but its
age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement.”75

County of Sacramento v. Lewis:76
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid
and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of
rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute
a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense

73 Id. at 36. Although Justice Scalia would not go as far as to say “that every practice
sanctioned by history is constitutional,” id. at 38, he would certainly give dispositive
weight to widespread adherence to a historical practice (“I reject the principle . . . that a
traditional procedure of our society becomes unconstitutional whenever the Members of
this Court ‘lose . . . confidence’ in it.” Scalia, J., concurring in judgment, id. (internal
citations omitted)), emphasizing that the Due Process’s “‘function is negative, not
affirmative, and it carries no mandate for particular measures of reform.’” Id. at 39 (internal
citations omitted).
74 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
75 Id. at 430–31 (internal citations omitted).
76 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
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of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial.77
....
We have emphasized time and again that “[t]he touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), whether
the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness,
see, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972),
(the procedural due process guarantee protects against “arbitrary
takings”), or in the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective,
see, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S., at 331 (the substantive due
process guarantee protects against government power arbitrarily
and oppressively exercised). While due process protection in the
substantive sense limits what the government may do in both its
legislative, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), and its executive capacities, see, e.g., Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary
differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer that is at issue.78

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.:79
[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate
the due process “principle of general application in Anglo–
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or
to which he has not been made a party by service of process,” it
being “our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court[.]’” Although “we have recognized an
exception to the general rule when, in certain limited
circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests
adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is
a party,” or “where a special remedial scheme exists expressly
foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in
bankruptcy or probate,” the burden of justification rests on the
exception . . . .
....
. . . We raised the flag on this issue of due process more than a
decade ago in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985) [and] held that out-of-state plaintiffs could not invoke the
77
78
79

Id. at 850 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)).
Id. at 845–46.
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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same due process limits on personal jurisdiction that out-of-state
defendants had under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. But we also saw that before an
absent
class
member’s
right
of
action
was
extinguishable due process required that the member “receive
notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the
litigation,” and we said that “at a minimum . . . an absent plaintiff
[must] be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from
the class.”80

Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc.:81
In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961), we said: “The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation. ‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances. It is compounded of history, reason, the
past course of decisions . . . .”82

Justice Ginsburg dissenting in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White:83
This judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the
litigant’s right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to “an impartial and disinterested tribunal
in both civil and criminal cases[.] The proscription against pledges
or promises thus represents an accommodation of “constitutionally
protected interests [that] lie on both sides of the legal equation.”
Balanced against the candidate’s interest in free expression is the
litigant’s “powerful and independent constitutional interest in fair
adjudicative procedure.” (“Two principles are in conflict and
must, to the extent possible, be reconciled . . . . The roots of both
principles lie deep in our constitutional heritage.”).
The
impartiality
guaranteed
to
litigants
through
the Due Process Clause adheres to a core principle: “[N]o man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.”
Our cases have “jealously guarded” that basic concept, for it
“ensur[es] that no person will be deprived of his interests in the
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”84
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 846–48.
532 U.S. 189 (2001).
Id. at 196–97.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 813–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Wilkinson v. Austin:85
Our procedural due process cases have consistently observed that
these are among the most important procedural mechanisms for purposes
of avoiding erroneous deprivations.86
Turner v. Rogers:87
“[W]e consequently determine the ‘specific dictates of due process’
by examining the ‘distinct factors’ that this Court has previously found
useful
in
deciding
what
specific
safeguards
the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil
proceeding fundamentally fair.”88
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro:89
“Due process protects the defendant’s right not to be coerced except
by lawful judicial power.”90
Bank Markazi v. Peterson:91
“The Due Process Clause also protects the interest in fair notice and
repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.”92
Although a general pattern of due process analysis has emerged and
is reflected in many of the above quotations, the absence of a unifying
theory is evident and there remains some areas of critical disagreement
pertaining to application.
The Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior Court93 reflects some
of that tension. Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, tightly linked due

85

545 U.S. 209 (2005).
Id. at 226 (citing see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. V. Loundermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543
(1985); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (“For more than a century the central
meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified’” (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864))).
87 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
88 Id. at 444–45. It is interesting to note how the Court, in determining whether the case
presents a violation of procedural due process rights, refer to “factors” of a test, rather than
to the overarching principle. Will those “factors” always provide the right guidance? Are
those factors exhaustive, comprehensive? Do they properly capture the wide range of
interests that any given situation might present? Do they thoroughly address the risk of
error? In the absence of an underlying, comprehensive, overarching due process
theory/principle capable of application to a wide range of cases, it is hard to answer. Also,
the absence of any such theory will require the formulation of further tests as we are
presented with new situations that do not perfectly fit the Mathews test.
89 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
90 Id. at 877.
91 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
92 Id. at 1325.
93 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
86
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process to tradition and settled usage.94 Justice White, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, admitted the possibility that a widespread
practice validated by tradition could still violate due process if it were “so
arbitrary and lacking in common sense.”95 And Justice Brennan,
concurring in the judgment, took an even less charitable view of historical
practices, stating, “‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice’ can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms
that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.”96
While the distinctions among the Burnham Justices may turn less on
the meaning of due process than on each Justice’s views of the Court’s
interpretive function, it remains possible, and perhaps likely, that this
divergence of views is also a product of the lack of a theoretical foundation
for the Court’s jurisprudence of due process.97
B. What’s missing?
What’s missing in the above opinions is the overarching due process
principle, the foundational due process theory from which new rules and
doctrines might be derived by way of interpretation. This deficiency is

94 Id. at 622 (characterizing due process as “a doctrine of personal jurisdiction that
dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed
unquestionably meets that standard.”).
95 Id. at 628.
96 Id. at 630 (internal citations omitted).
97 Id. at 101–02; see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936)
(“A determination of the question whether the tax is valid in respect of the point now under
review requires an examination of the history and circumstances which antedated and
attended the adoption of the abridgement clause of the First Amendment, since that clause
expresses one of those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions’ and, as such, is embodied in the concept ‘due
process of law’ and, therefore, protected against hostile state invasion by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted); De Jonge v. State of
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion
elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and
political institutions—principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the
general terms of its due process clause.”); Buchalter v. People of State of New York, 319
U.S. 427, 429–30 (1943) (“The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that action by a state through any of its agencies must be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions, which not infrequently are designated as the ‘law of the land.’”);
Lyons v. State of Okl., 322 U.S. 596, 601–02 (1944) (“The federal question presented is
whether the second confession was given under such circumstances that its use as evidence
at the trial constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which requires that state criminal proceedings ‘shall be consistent with
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice.”).
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puzzling given that every procedural category used or discussed by the
Court is premised on that very theory.
So what could be the reason behind this deficiency? Could it be, as
the Court observed, that “[t]he basic procedural protections of the common
law have been regarded as so fundamental, [that] very few cases have
arisen in which a party has complained of their denial?”98 Or is it perhaps
that procedural due process is one of those very concepts whose meaning
and scope are so pervasive and so intuitive that they don’t require full
articulation? But is either really so? What if the lack of true understanding
of the theory of procedural due process were responsible for the scarce
number of procedural due process complaints? And what if the lack of true
understanding of the theory of procedural due process were responsible of
some of the Court’s opinions that are hardly conducive of democracy?99
Although the scope of procedural due process is so pervasive, it is not
necessarily equally intuitive.
The theory of procedural due process that one derives from the
Court’s passages above is one requiring “minimum procedural
safeguards,”100 “rules . . . shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process,”101 and by “those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions,”102 rules
intended to promote an “accurate determination of decisional facts, and
informed by unbiased exercises of official discretion.”103 The principle,
so described, remains general, and necessarily so given that, as the Court
explained, the concept is “flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”104 Procedural due process
doesn’t demand exactness.105 Instead, it only demands that the procedure
in place, balancing fairness and efficiency concerns, and the opposing
interests of the parties and the judicial system as a whole, reaches the
optimal result.

98

Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1994).
See infra Part III.
100 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 624 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring).
101 Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985).
102 De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364.
103 O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 797 (1980).
104 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip., 499 U.S. 1, 53 (1991).
105 See, for example, the standards of “more likely than not”, “clear and convincing
evidence,”—applicable in civil cases—and “beyond reasonable doubt”—applicable in
criminal cases. None of these standards requires exactness, certainty. But they are all
intended to achieve the optimal balance between the various conflicting interests and needs
of the parties involved, of the judicial system, and society, as well as the needs of logic,
efficiency, fairness, and democracy.
99
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Justice Scalia would likely disagree with the above description.106
He would argue that the text of the Constitution or, in its absence, the
common law practices and procedure should control. Stare decisis,
though, and adherence to the established rules and practices should be just
part of the analysis if we are to adhere to due process. A due process
analysis would factor in the past, but would not lead the past control the
present, a result that would clearly be inconsistent not only with due
process, but with the very essence of the common law system,107 a system
designed to be flexible, in service of the people, evolving with the people.
Justice Scalia, though, viewed stare decisis as indispensable to achieve the
equal protection of the laws,108 and that approach, sometimes followed by

106 See supra notes 72 and 93–94 and accompanying text. See also Justice Scalia, The
Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 (1989):
I had always thought that the common-law approach had at least one thing to
be said for it: it was the course of judicial restraint, “making” as little law as
possible in order to decide the case at hand. I have come to doubt whether that
is true. For when, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general
rule, and say, “This is the basis of our decision,” I not only constrain lower
courts, I constrain myself as well. If the next case should have such different
facts that my political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite
the opposite, I will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed
myself to the governing principle. In the real world of appellate judging, it
displays more judicial restraint to adopt such a course than to announce that,
“on balance,” we think the law was violated here— leaving ourselves free to
say in the next case that, “on balance,” it was not. It is a commonplace that
the one effective check upon arbitrary judges is criticism by the bar and the
academy. But it is no more possible to demonstrate the inconsistency of two
opinions based upon a “totality of the circumstances” test than it is to
demonstrate the inconsistency of two jury verdicts. Only by announcing rules
do we hedge ourselves in.
107 When commenting on the common law system, Justice Scalia noted that
sticking close to those facts, not relying upon overarching generalizations,
and thereby leaving considerable room for future judges is thought to be the
genius of the common law system. The law grows and develops, the theory
goes, not through the pronouncement of general principles, but case-by-case,
deliberately, incrementally, one-step-at-a-time. Today we decide that these
nine facts sustain recovery. Whether only eight of them will do so—or
whether the addition of a tenth will change the outcome—are questions for
another day.
Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1177.
108 Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1178 (“To begin with,
the value of perfection in judicial decisions should not be overrated. To achieve what is,
from the standpoint of the substantive policies involved, the ‘perfect’ answer is nice—but
it is just one of a number of competing values. And one of the most substantial of those
competing values, which often contradicts the search for perfection, is the appearance of
equal treatment . . . . The Equal Protection Clause epitomizes justice more than any other
provision of the Constitution. And the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to
judicial law making is that it does not satisfy this sense of justice very well. When a case
is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of
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the Court, has led to results that are hardly conducive of due process and
democratic values.
Roscoe Pound described the jurisprudential thinking over time in
terms of jurisprudence of conceptions, a jurisprudence of premises, and an
empirical jurisprudence.109 Under the jurisprudence of conceptions
“[c]ertain fundamental conceptions are worked out from traditional legal
principles, and the rules for the cause in hand are deduced from these
conceptions by a purely logical process.”110 The jurisprudence of premises
takes “the rules of a traditional system . . . as premises and . . . develop[s]
these premises in accordance with some theory of the ends to be met or of
the relation which they should bear, when applied, to the social condition
of the time being.”111 Here, pure logic is tempered by consideration of the
consequences, but still the analysis is cabined within the abstract legal
standards and categories. Finally, an empirical jurisprudence begins with
the facts and operates through a “process of inclusion and exclusion” and
a method of “trial-hypothesis and confirmation” to discover the law.112
Pound thought that the first two categories of jurisprudence—
conceptions and premises—were inadequate, as both were premised to
some extent on the perceived immutability of established legal standards.
If not based on natural law itself, they operated on the natural-law
understanding that law can be perfectly established and, once so
established, can serve as a sufficient tool for solving present claims and
controversies, even those that were unanticipated by the law maker. Pound
thought that the empirical jurisprudence was problematic too: the law
would develop too slowly through the case-by-case approach, and courts
were “over-ambitio[us]” when “lay[ing] down universal rules,” turning
the empirical jurisprudence into a jurisprudence of conceptions.113 Pound
still considered the empirical jurisprudence to be the best of the
alternatives, despite its flaws.
As I have elsewhere argued,114 the current U.S. Supreme Court’s
modern jurisprudence doesn’t fit any of the above categories. The Court’s
jurisprudence can’t be described as a jurisprudence of conceptions or
premises as, even if the Court often invokes established principles, it just
as often ignores those principles or distorts them in service of unstated
justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be
so.”).
109 Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361 (1913).
110 Id. at 371.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 372.
114 See SIMONA GROSSI, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE MODERN COMMON LAW
APPROACH, 6–7 (2015).
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goals. Often the Court sees cases and opinions as opportunities to legislate,
and when it legislates, it does so through narrow rules and rigid multipart
formulas that are not conducive to due process analysis.115 And the
Court’s jurisprudence cannot be described as empirical either when its
purported goal is to discover the true meaning of the law in original
understandings and fundamental texts, beyond the very facts before the
Court.
The Court’s modern jurisprudence and, in particular Justice Scalia’s
interpretive approach, is not conducive to due process. As the Court noted
in the late XIX century, to make stare decisis controlling “would be to
deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”116
A textual approach to due process that views the due process function
as a “negative, not affirmative, [one carrying] no mandate for particular
measures of reform”117 negates the very essence of due process and
deprives due process of the potential of inspiring and ultimately shaping
rules and doctrines in service of our democratic system. And, in any event,
even if the Court has sometimes described the due process function as a
“negative” one, that is, one intended to protect the individual against
arbitrary state action,118 due process has a positive function too as it
imposes an obligation on the states to provide a judicial system that is fair,
efficient, and just.
The core of due process is balance. It is the balance between the
interests of the individuals—the parties directly and indirectly affected by
the rule, doctrine, or the outcome of the litigation—and the society those
individuals belong to. It is the balance between formalism—intended as
adherence to the rule of law, transparency, and predictability—and
pragmatism—intended as a case-by-case approach to the facts and
innovation, adaptation of the given categories to the specific needs of the
cases, and consideration of the totality of the circumstances presented.119

115 Id. See, e.g., Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 106, at 1177 (“[P]erfect
justice can only be achieved if courts are unconstrained by such imperfect
generalizations.”). Justice Scalia also thought narrow rules were indispensable in a
common law system where the Supreme Court only reviews “an insignificant proportion
of the decided cases” and “will revisit the area in question with great infrequency.” Id. at
1178.
116 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528–29 (1884).
117 Owney v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921).
118 See, e.g., id.; see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY,
97–98 (4th ed. 2002).
119 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998). Rejecting the
“totality of the circumstances” approach, Justice Scalia noted:
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The demand of justice that each case presents comes from the very facts
of that case, to which a judge must attend, balancing the conflicting
interests and needs. And it is the balance between pre-existing ideas and
conceptions and the needs for reform.
That balance is the core of due process should not surprise, as due
process is intended to achieve peace, and peace is balance. The more
factors, that is, the more variables meaningfully affecting any given
situation that balance will ponder, the more that balance will minimize the
risk of error and approximate peace.120 The fact-finding role of the judge
The fact is that when we decide a case on the basis of what we have come to
call the “totality of the circumstances” test, it is not we who will be “closing
in on the law” in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different courts of
appeals—or, if it is a federal issue that can arise in state court litigation as
well, thirteen different courts of appeals and fifty state supreme courts. To
adopt such an approach, in other words, is effectively to conclude that
uniformity is not a particularly important objective with respect to the legal
question at issue.
Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 107, at 1179. Scalia also noted that:
when an appellate judge comes up with nothing better than a totality of the
circumstances test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the
law in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact
finding. That is certainly how we describe the function of applying the most
venerable totality of the circumstances test of them all—the “reasonable man”
standard for determining negligence in the law of torts. At the margins, of
course, that determination, like every determination of pure fact or mixed fact
and law, can become an issue of law—if, for example, there is no evidence
on which any jury can reasonably find negligence. And even short of that
extreme, the courts have introduced some elements of law into the
determination—the rule, for example, that disregard of some statutorily
prescribed safeguards is negligence per se, or the opposite rule that
compliance with all the requirements of certain statutes precludes a finding
of negligence. But when all those legal rules have been exhausted and have
yielded no answer, we call what remains to be decided a question of fact—
which means not only that it is meant for the jury rather than the judge, but
also that there is no single “right” answer. It could go either way. Only, as I
say, at the margins can an appellate judge say that this determination must
come out the other way as a matter of law.
Id. at 1180–81.
120 Justice Scalia, though, would reduce the variables at stake in due process analysis to
one: predictability.
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as
possible a clear, general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler
times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.
Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the
means of knowing what it prescribes . . . . As laws have become more
numerous, and as people have become increasingly ready to punish their
adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford protracted uncertainty
regarding what the law may mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it,
“reckonability,” is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.
There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.
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is essential to the judge’s justice mission. So, the factual component is
essential to legal analysis, and in fact, it is essential to any legal analysis
that is consistent with due process, as the law doesn’t exist in abstract, it
exists and is created through the facts, with the facts.
A judicial opinion that gave primacy to the law over the facts of the
case would fail to accomplish its justice mission. Hence, the Court’s
approach and Justice Scalia’s position to the contrary121 are troublesome.
And it is troublesome that Justice Scalia viewed balance in legal analysis
as the very last resort.122
The legislature operates in a place far remote from cases. And in
making the best synthesis, the best balance of the variables most recurring
in the type of cases under exam that it can, the legislature produces rules
that are capable of application to a wide range of cases. To be optimal and
consistent with due process those rules should factor in the various
conflicting interests at stake, the needs of fairness, efficiency, logic,
democracy, and they should be drafted in a way that provides guidance to
judges and lawyers without unnecessarily constraining these actors’
discretion. The legislature’s rules should allow judges and lawyers to
draw balances of the conflicting interests that would be optimal in any
given situation.
This is because judges and lawyers, unlike the legislature, will in fact
be exposed to real cases, each presenting variables that might not
necessarily be those originally considered by the legislature. To be
consistent with the balance of due process, the legislative rules should
allow lawyers and judges to catch and ponder the new variables that each
case presents. And in deciding the very cases presented and formulating
doctrines that interpret the existing rules and principles, judges should
disclose the analytic path followed, the various conflicting interests at
stake, the needs of efficiency, fairness, logic, and the way in which those
Id. at 1799. And, yes, predictability ensures that procedure be fair and just and efficient,
but predictability is just one factor. An opinion that is predictable but that does not make
justice in the particular case presented, one that doesn’t optimally balance the conflicting
interests at stake, is not necessarily a just opinion.
121 See infra Part III.
122 Justice Scalia observed:
We will have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of
analysis with us forever—and for my sins, I will probably write some of the
opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of analysis be avoided
where possible; that the Rule of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as
the nature of the question allows; and that, to foster a correct attitude toward
the matter, we appellate judges bear in mind that when we have finally
reached the point where we can do no more than consult the totality of the
circumstances, we are acting more as fact-finders than as expositors of the
law.
Justice Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 107, at 1187 (emphasis added).
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interests and needs have been balanced. The judicial doctrine or formula
finally endorsed should be flexible enough to allow other judges and
lawyers to use it prospectively and adapt it to still other different situations
presented.
Due process fits well into a representative democracy, and easily
aligns with the inherently democratic principles of liberty and equality.
Thus, the requirement that the law be established honors the democratic
voice in the lawmaking function as well as the principle of fair notice,
while the proscription against arbitrary laws honors the democratic
commitment to equality.
Whether a law is deemed arbitrary depends on whether it contains
discernable standards and whether those standards are reasonable. The
absence of discernable standards runs the risk of violating the principle of
equality. But the absence of reasonableness would invite unjustified
intrusions on liberty. As to the latter, the due process measure of
reasonableness requires a balancing of the private and public interests at
stake. This balancing must take into account fairness, efficiency,
institutional competence, and the ultimate rationality of the standard at
issue. As Justice Harlan recognized in his Poe v. Ullman dissent, the
demands of that rationality will vary with the nature of the right and the
scope of the intrusion.123
Given the inherent democratic commitment to liberty and equality,
due process rationality must require something more than just a deeply
held belief in the righteousness of the law.124 Rather, rationality must be
built on facts. In other words, democratic rationality requires a faithneutral examination of the facts. That does not mean that faith plays no
part in a democracy; faith may be the driving force that leads to the
enactment of a rational statute such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But
faith alone cannot justify the democratic rationality of the enactment.
Hence, democratic rationality is a rationality premised on facts and reason.
In the context of substantive due process, that means that a law’s
legitimacy cannot rest on faith alone; and in the context of procedure, “this
is how we’ve always done it,” cannot itself establish the modern rationality
of the procedure at issue.

123

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522–55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“Judges are not free, in
defining “due process,” to impose on law enforcement officials our “personal and private
notions” of fairness and to “disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function.”)
(internal citations omitted).
124
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III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURE
Testing some procedural rules and doctrines against the due process
platform provided in Part II will help identify inconsistencies with the due
process theory so far articulated, and further refine the theory itself.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Gully v. First Nat. Bank,125 the Court articulated the subject matter,
federal-question, arising-under formula as follows:
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element,
and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The right or
immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution
or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect,
and defeated if they receive another. A genuine and present
controversy, not merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist
with reference thereto, and the controversy must be disclosed upon
the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition
for removal. Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as a basis
of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the
plaintiff’s cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable
defense.126

The Gully Court also added:
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the attempt
to define a ‘cause of action’ without reference to the context. To
define broadly and in the abstract ‘a case arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States’ has hazards of a kindred
order. What is needed is something of that common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation.
One could carry the search for causes backward, almost without
end. Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside. As
in problems of causation, so here in the search for the underlying
law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless claims of right
can be discovered to have their source or their operative limits in
the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself with
its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set
bounds to the pursuit, the courts have formulated the distinction
between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral,

125
126

299 U.S. 109 (1936).
Id. at 112–13 (internal citations omitted).
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between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely
possible. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.127

The formula, flexible and principled, perfectly captured the law of
subject matter jurisdiction as it then stood: federal law had to be an
essential element of the plaintiff’s claim for a federal court to have federal
question jurisdiction over that claim. And it made sense. If the
controversy on federal law is “merely possible or conjectural,”128 a federal
court’s involvement in the dispute won’t be supported by § 1331. And, of
course, the subject matter jurisdiction inquiry must be a context-specific
inquiry, one that requires a “common-sense accommodation of judgment
to kaleidoscopic situations.”129 By assessing the plaintiff’s claim in the
case, one for breach of contract, one whose resolution did not depend on
the interpretation, application, or effect of federal law, the Court concluded
that the case was not one arising under federal law and, thus, federal courts
would not have subject matter jurisdiction over it.
As described, the Gully subject matter jurisdiction formula seems
complete, adaptable to the many different variables that each case may
present, and truthful to the idea of federal courts as courts for the
vindication and enforcement of federal rights and the uniform
interpretation and application of federal law.130 The opinion in Gunn v.
Minton131 is hard to reconcile with this formula and, more generally, with
due process.
Endorsing the subject matter jurisdiction test articulated in Grable &
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mgf.,132 the Gunn Court
found that the plaintiff’s malpractice claim whose success depended on
the interpretation and application of federal patent law did not arise under
federal law, because it foundered on the third prong of the Grable test.
Basically, although federal law was essential to the plaintiff’s claim,133 and
“actually disputed,”134 it was not “substantial”—that is, not important
enough for the federal system as a whole135—as the legal malpractice
claim posed a federal question “in a merely hypothetical sense,”136 and
127

Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 113.
129 Id.
130 For further elaboration of this theme, see Simona Grossi, A Modified Theory, supra
note 10, at 973–74.
131 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
132 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
133 Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
134 Id. at 1065–66.
135 Id. at 1066.
136 Id. at 1066–67 (Because of the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice
claim, the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised
a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the patent infringement proceeding
128
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was “fact-bound and situation specific,”137 that is, not “controlling
numerous other cases.”138 And because the claim foundered on the third
prong of the Grable test, “[i]t follow[ed] that Grable’s fourth requirement
[was] also not met.”139
The opinion, entangled in the Grable test, failed to realistically
appraise the plaintiff’s claim and gave primacy to the government’s
interests, whatever they were in the case—hard to imagine that the federal
government would not have a “strong interest” in providing a federal
forum for the interpretation and application of patent law—over the
interest of the plaintiff in having a federal forum for the vindication of his
federal rights. And, even more troubling, the Court indicated that claims
that were “fact-bound and situation specific” would not meet the
“substantial” prong of the Grable test. What about the realistic appraisal
demanded by due process? What about the need to be attentive and
responsive to the changing facts and circumstances? And was Gunn
respectful of Gully? One could say that the modern approach to subject
matter jurisdiction has to be traced to Grable, not to Gully. But if one
could defend the result in Grable under the “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice,” I’m not sure one could equally defend Gunn under
similar bases.
What about the plaintiff’s rights and expectations? And was the
interest of the judicial system as a whole in having federal courts available
for the uniform interpretation and application of federal law and for the
vindication of federal rights properly respected and considered? In this
respect, the Gunn Court noted that
even assuming that a state court’s case-within-a-case adjudication
may be preclusive under some circumstances, the result would be
have been different? No matter how the state courts resolve that hypothetical “case within
a case,” it will not change the real-world result of the prior federal patent
litigation. Minton’s patent will remain invalid.).
137 Id. at 1068.
138 Id. at 1067.
139 Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068. The Court noted:
That requirement is concerned with the appropriate “balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.” We have already explained the absence of a
substantial federal issue within the meaning of Grable. The States, on the
other hand, have ‘a special responsibility for maintaining standards among
members of the licensed professions.’ Their ‘interest . . . in regulating
lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been
officers of the courts.’ We have no reason to suppose that Congress—in
establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar
from state courts state legal malpractice claims simply because they require
resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.
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limited to the parties and patents that had been before the state
court. Such “fact-bound and situation-specific” effects are not
sufficient to establish federal arising under jurisdiction.
Nor can we accept the suggestion that the federal courts’ greater
familiarity with patent law means that legal malpractice cases like
this one belong in federal court. It is true that a similar interest was
among those we considered in Grable. But the possibility that a
state court will incorrectly resolve a state claim is not, by itself,
enough to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction,
even if the potential error finds its root in a misunderstanding of
patent law.140

In other words, the possibility that the individual’s federal rights
might not be properly honored should be given no weight in the analysis.
The individual’s interests and rights were left out of the formula.
The Court seemed to be concerned about the state system more than
the individual. After all, the Court noted, a state court’s decision on patent
law would not affect the development of federal patent law.141 But
wouldn’t it? Shouldn’t we expect the patent lawyers to inform their
methods and modes of litigating patent cases to the state courts’ approach
to specific patent issues, as after Gunn, this is the exclusive place where
they’ll be sued on legal malpractice claims arising from patent litigations?
The individual’s interests are not considered, the system’s interests
and the consequences on the system are not properly assessed, and the
contextual, realistic appraisal of the facts is discarded.142 The opinion
doesn’t seem informed by due process at all.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
In 1945, International Shoe Co. v. Washington143 extended the
traditional territorial reach of personal jurisdiction to cases where, even if
the defendant “be not present within the territory of the forum, he [has]
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”144
When that happens, the exercise of personal jurisdiction will be consistent
with due process,145 and it is so because the defendant’s “sufficient
140

Id. at 1067–68 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1068.
142 In this respect, the Gunn Court also affirms that “for the reasons we discuss, we are
comfortable concluding that state legal malpractice claims based on underlying patent
matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law for purposes of §1338(a).” Id. at
1065.
143 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
144 Id. at 316.
145 Id.
141
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contacts or ties with the state of the forum . . . make it reasonable and just
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred
there.”146
The International Shoe formula was principled and flexible, it called
for a realistic appraisal of the facts (the defendant’s contacts with the
forum) while being respectful of the established tradition (“traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice”); it balanced the interests of
the defendant (being sued in a forum where it could expect to be sued), the
plaintiff (being able to sue in the forum where the claim arose and where
the injury occurred), and the forum state and the judicial system as a whole
(in having lawsuits tried in the forum where the center of gravity was); and
it complied with logic, fairness and efficiency. It made sense to try a case
where the evidence would be, where the conduct complained of took place
(center of gravity), and the injured party was. The exercise of jurisdiction
in the forum would be fair to the parties and their need to defend (the bulk
of the evidence would be in the forum), and it would be efficient (there
would be an optimal use of judicial and parties’ resources, as the evidence
would be in the forum, and a judge of the forum would be called to
interpret and apply a law of the forum state that was violated).
That elegant, due process approach was not followed by the Court in
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,147 an opinion that is hard to
reconcile with International Shoe. In McIntyre, Nicastro, a resident of
New Jersey, severely injured himself while using a three-ton metal
shearing machine manufactured by the British manufacturer McIntyre
UK.148 McIntyre UK had not directly shipped the machine to the forum,
but instead its exclusive distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.,
had. But, despite the similar names, McIntyre UK and McIntyre America
were separate and independent entities.149 And since McIntyre UK “had
no office in New Jersey; it [did not pay] taxes nor owned property there;
and it [did not] advertise[] in, nor sent any employees to, the State . . . [and
did not] ‘have a single contact with New Jersey short of the machine in
question ending up in this state[,]’ . . . [t]hese facts . . . do not show that
J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”150
Hence, the New Jersey court had no personal jurisdiction over McIntyre
UK.

146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 320.
564 U.S. 873 (2011).
Id. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 896–97.
Id. at 886.
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The realistic appraisal of the facts, that is, of the defendant’s contacts
with the forum, is confined to the few paragraphs in Part I of the plurality
opinion,151 authored by Justice Kennedy. A more accurate and
comprehensive assessment of those facts is offered by Justice Ginsburg,
in her dissenting opinion.152 It is only there that we learn that Nicastro had
severed four fingers of his right hand while using the machine;153 that the
price of one machine was $ 24,900;154 that the machine ended up in New
Jersey as a direct consequence of the successful marketing efforts of the
defendant,155 and in the regular course of the defendant’s business;156 and
that McIntyre UK had instructed its exclusive American distributor to sell
the machines “anywhere in the U.S,”157 with no fear of successful litigation
against McIntyre in the U.S. as “the product was built and designed by
McIntyre Machinery in the UK and the buck stops here—if there’s
something wrong with the machine,”158 and, in any event, “the
manufacturer had products liability insurance coverage.”159 As Justice
Ginsburg observed, the above realistic assessment of the facts coupled
with a respect for the tradition, should have led to a finding of jurisdiction:
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United
States for machines it manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial
revenue from sales it makes to United States purchasers. Where in
the United States buyers reside does not matter to this
manufacturer. Its goal is simply to sell as much as it can, wherever
it can. It excludes no region or State from the market it wishes to
reach. But, all things considered, it prefers to avoid products
liability litigation in the United States. To that end, it engages a
U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside. Has it succeeded in
escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one of its products
is sold and causes injury or even death to a local user?
Under this Court’s pathmarking precedent in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, and subsequent decisions, one would expect
the answer to be unequivocally, “No.” But instead, six Justices of
this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has
151

Id. at 878–79.
Id. at 893–98.
153 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 894.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 895 (“CSM’s owner, Frank Curcio, ‘first heard of [McIntyre UK’s] machine
while attending an Institute of Scrap Metal Industries [(ISRI)] convention in Las Vegas in
1994 or 1995, where [McIntyre UK] was an exhibitor.’”).
156 Id. at 896 (“McIntyre UK representatives attended every ISRI convention from 1990
through 2005.”).
157 Id. at 898.
158 Id. at 897.
159 McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 897.
152
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avoided the jurisdiction of our state courts, except perhaps in
States where its products are sold in sizeable quantities.
Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered
majority today “turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern
long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into
court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands
of a product by having independent distributors market it.”160

And the opposite conclusion reached by the plurality and Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion161 took “a giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play
and substantial justice’ underlying International Shoe.”162
The opinion in McIntyre also failed to balance the interest of the
defendant against the interest of the plaintiff and the judicial system as a
whole. Of course the defendant would be better off if sued in its own
country, but what about the plaintiff, the individual who was injured in his
forum while using the machine that the defendant has sold there making
profit out of it? And would the judicial system as a whole support such a
finding of non-jurisdiction? Essentially denying access to justice to a
citizen of the forum, asking him to submit to a foreign jurisdiction and
most likely foreign law to be compensated for the wrongful, and yet
profitable, activity engaged in by the foreign corporation in the plaintiff’s
own state? Doesn’t this result defy logic, common sense, the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice?
If the answers to the above questions suggest that the opinion in
McIntyre was not consistent with due process, then why did the Court
reach that result? We may make hypotheses, build assumptions. The Court
was probably motivated by concerns for international relations.163 Or the
Court just thought it was properly interpreting and applying the
precedents—International Shoe, Hanson v. Denckla,164 World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,165 Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty.,166 Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal.,
County of Marin.167 And it was some of the precedents that might have

160

Id. at 893–94 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 887–93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162 Id. at 910 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163 See, e.g., Daimler A.G. v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (“the Solicitor
General informs us, in this regard, that ‘foreign governments’ objections to some domestic
courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of
international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.”).
164 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
165 44 U.S. 286 (1980).
166 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
167 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
161
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determined the outcome of the case, more specifically, Hanson and
Burnham:
The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the
defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power
of a sovereign. In other words, the defendant must “purposefully
avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.”168

And:
The conclusion that jurisdiction is in the first instance a question
of authority rather than fairness explains, for example, why the
principal opinion in Burnham “conducted no independent inquiry
into the desirability or fairness” of the rule that service of process
within a State suffices to establish jurisdiction over an otherwise
foreign defendant.169

But the realistic appraisal demanded by International Shoe did not
make purposeful availment a determinative factor of the jurisdictional
inquiry. If you think about it, purposeful availment—or the defendant’s
intent to enjoy, avail itself of “the benefits and protection of the laws of
the state,”170 or “target,”171 using Justice Kennedy’s word—might be hard,
and at times very hard, to determine. And the International Shoe Court’s
innovative contribution to the law of personal jurisdiction was to make
clear that fictions—like the defendant’s voluntary submission to the
authority of the sovereign—should be abandoned in favor of a realistic
approach.172
C. Standing
The Court described the key elements of the doctrine of standing in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
168 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882 (2011) (internal citation
omitted).
169 Id. at 883.
170 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
171 See, e.g., McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877.
172 Along these lines, see Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in McIntyre (“Finally,
in International Shoe itself, and decisions thereafter, the Court has made plain that legal
fictions, notably ‘presence’ and ‘implied consent,’ should be discarded, for they conceal
the actual bases on which jurisdiction rests.”). Id. at 900. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not
the result of the independent action of some third party not before
the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.173

If we examine the basic elements of standing—injury, causation, and
redressability—though, we see that they do no more than describe the
elements of a claim. Thus, a plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed for lack
of standing if it doesn’t pass the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss-forfailure-to-state-a-claim muster; and it should not be dismissed on those
grounds when it is legally sufficient.174 But this has not always been the
case, and some of the Court’s opinions that depart from this idea are hard
to reconcile with due process, as the synthesis of conflicting interests that
they are premised on discount the rights of the plaintiffs and the interest
of the judicial system in providing federal courts for the vindication of
federal rights.
In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,175 the plaintiff sought to establish the
unconstitutionality of a state child-support law that had been interpreted
as not being enforceable against fathers of children born out of wedlock.
The plaintiff sought an order that would preclude the state from denying
enforcement of those laws solely on the basis of the father’s unmarried
status. But she ultimately wanted the father of her child to pay child
support.176 The Court focused on the probability of success of this ultimate
“remedy” to show that her claim was not redressable since it was not clear
that the father would pay that support even if the law were enforced against
him.177 But had the Court attended to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim,
it would have realized that the plaintiff had asserted a well-recognized
right of action—the equal enforcement of the laws—that, if meritorious,
173 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted).
174 I more extensively examine the idea of standing analysis as a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis
in The Claim, supra note 10. See also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
175 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
176 See Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 739–40 (1984) (remedy for equal protection
violation is equal treatment).
177 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618 (“The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the
future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the
‘direct’ relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated,
which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of standing, is absent in
this case.”).

2017]

Procedural Due Process

193

would entitle her to relief, namely, a wedlock-neutral application of
prosecutorial discretion.
Clapper v. Amnesty In’l178 is equally problematic. In Clapper,
attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations sued,
among others, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney
General, seeking a declaration that the provision of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) allowing surveillance of individuals who were
not “United States persons” and were reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States, was unconstitutional, as well as an injunction
against surveillance authorized by the provision.179
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate standing, essentially because the
future injury they feared—surveillance—was not “certainly impending,”
and it was not fairly traceable to the FSIA provision at issue.180 In tracing
the contours of the modern standing theory, the Court observed that “it is
no surprise that respondents fail to offer any evidence that their
communications have been monitored under §1881a, a failure that
substantially undermines their standing theory;”181 and that “respondents
in the present case present no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears,
but instead rest on mere conjecture about possible governmental
actions.”182 One, though, wonders how realistically could the plaintiffs
have offered evidence that their conversations had been monitored, and
whether asking for evidence at the pleading stage is consistent with the
Rules, the jurisprudence interpreting them, and the very idea of litigation
as a process that through discovery and dispositive motions, resolves
disputes and provides the stage for the enforcement of rights and the
development of substantive law.
Again, the individual’s rights as well as the interest of the system in
providing a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights were not
factored in, or if they were, they were not adequately factored. And, in
any event, given that the due process balance engaged in by the Court, if
any at all, was not articulated in the opinion, the opinion doesn’t meet the
most fundamental due process and democratic aspirations.

178
179
180
181
182

133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1155.
133 S. Ct. at 1148 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
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D. Pleadings
Federal Rule of Civil Proceduire 8(a)(2) provides that “[a] pleading
that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”183 If the
complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2), the defendant will be able
to successfully move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss it for “failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.”184
Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) were meant to operate in the “notice
pleading” system, a system where pleadings are intended to open the doors
to discovery with minimal considerations of the claim asserted.185 The
idea was that the factual and legal sufficiency of the claim would be
examined after discovery, on a motion for summary judgment, that is, after
the facts and theories supportive of the claim could be fully developed
through an open exchange of information between the parties.186 Forcing
the text and the spirit of Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6), though, Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly187 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal188 created a new pleading regime
described as “plausibility pleading.” The current pleading standard
focuses formalistically on the cause of action and not on the general nature
of the claim, and the claim is easily extinguished before being fully
examined.189
Both Twombly and Iqbal’s complaints would have survived the Rule
12(b)(6) muster in the notice pleading regime preceding Twombly and
Iqbal. And that makes sense. At the beginning of the litigation the
plaintiff does not have access to all the information necessary to prevail
on the merits. And yet, unless the plaintiff’s claim “strike[s] a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very
remote and unlikely,’”190 the complaint may proceed to discovery. But
despite the apparent Twombly and Iqbal Courts’ adherence to this original
notice pleading idea, the Twombly Court found the plaintiffs’ complaint
under §1 of the Sherman Act191 insufficient because plaintiffs’ allegations
of parallel conduct and of some other reasons for not competing were not
sufficient, as plaintiffs had not ruled out other valid alternatives for not
competing.192 And similarly, the Iqbal Court found that the plaintiff’s
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
See Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra note 10.
Id.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See Simona Grossi, Frontloading, supra note 10.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Sherman Act,15 U.S.C.A., §1.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567 (“here we have an obvious alternative explanation.”).
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allegations of defendants’ intent to discriminate against him because of his
race and religion not sufficient as there might be “other neutral,
investigative reason” for the disparate treatment193 that the plaintiff had
not ruled out.194
What was the balance of interests analysis that the Court engaged in
when deciding to discard plaintiffs’ rights? Assuming those plaintiffs’
rights were factored in, was the interest of the judicial system in providing
a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights—those arising from
the Sherman Act and those arising in the context of a Bivens action195—
considered? And if the judicial system’s interest was considered, and the
national security interests prevailed over the interest in making a federal
forum available, was elevating the pleading standard the best method to
meet this prevailing national security interest?196 And what about the
consequences of both opinions—an antitrust case, and a national security
case—on future cases? Where those consequences considered? After all,
the Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard is supposed to apply to a wide range
of cases.197
Twombly and Iqbal hardly meet the due process aspirations of a
democratic judicial system.
E. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19, 23, and 26
Rule 19(a) provides that persons “required” to be joined—to accord
complete relief to the existing parties, or properly protect the absent
parties’ interest, or avoid a risk of double, multiple or inconsistent
obligations for the existing parties—should be joined if feasible, that is,
they should be joined if the court would have personal jurisdiction and
subject matter jurisdiction over them.198 If the joinder of such required
persons is not feasible, Rule 19(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
that a court might balance when determining “whether, in equity and good
193 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established
right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.”).
194 Id. at 682 (“As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for the arrests and the
purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a
plausible conclusion.”) (internal citations omitted).
195 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1999).
196 See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 664 (“Three of Iqbal’s arguments are rejected. (i) His claim
that Twombly should be limited to its antitrust context is not supported by that case or the
Federal Rules. Because Twombly interpreted and applied Rule 8, which in turn governs the
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions,’ Rule 1, the case applies to antitrust and
discrimination suits alike.”).
198 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
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conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should
be dismissed.”199
Rule 19(b) factors mirror the Rule 19(a) factors. But the Rule 19(b)’s
spectrum is broader than those of Rule 19(a) and seems to demand a due
process analysis of the joinder mechanism and its operation by calling for
a realistic appraisal of the specific facts of the case, and a balance of the
various and conflicting interests.200
The Supreme Court examined the mechanics of Rule 19201 in
Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel.202 In Pimentel, a stakeholder filed an
interpleader action against several claimants—including the Republic of
the Philippines (“the Republic”) and the Philippine Presidential
Commission (“the Commission”)—that were claiming an interest in the
stake, i.e., the property allegedly stolen by Ferdinand Marcos when he was
President of the Philippines.203 The Republic and Commission invoked
sovereign immunity and were dismissed from the action, but the action
proceeded to judgment over their objection.204 They contended that the
action should have been dismissed as they were indispensable parties
under Rule 19.205 The trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the

199

FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) (“(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s
absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any
prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the
person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate
remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.”). In Schutten v. Shell Oil Company,
421 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.1970), the court held that the essence of Rule 19 is to balance the
rights of all those whose interests are involved in the action:
The plaintiff has the right to “control” his own litigation and to choose his
own forum. This “right” is, however, like all other rights, “defined” by the
rights of others. Thus the defendant has the right to be safe from needless
multiple litigation and from incurring avoidable inconsistent obligations.
Likewise the interests of the outsider who cannot be joined must be
considered. Finally there is the public interest and the interest the court has in
seeing that insofar as possible the litigation will be both effective and
expeditious.
Id. at 873.
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 19. See, e.g., Glancy v. Taubman Centers, Inc., 373 F.3d 656, 665
(6th Cir.2004) (“Rule 19 calls for a pragmatic approach.”); Smith v. United Bhd. of
Carpenters, 685 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir.1982) (“Ideally, all . . . parties would be before the
court. Yet Rule 19 calls for a pragmatic approach . . . .”); 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1602
(3d ed.2001) (Rule 19 should be applied to promote the full adjudication of disputes with
minimum litigation efforts.).
202 553 U.S. 851 (2008).
203 Id. at 854–55.
204 Id. at 855.
205 Id. at 862.
200
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action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission.206 The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to order the
district court to dismiss the action.207 Without engaging in Rule 19(a)208
or Rule 19(b) analysis,209 the Court essentially resolved the joinder
question on comity and sovereign immunity grounds,210 denying the
plaintiffs access to justice. Had the Court attended to the text of Rule 19
and the due process analysis demanded by the rule, the result might have
been different. But even if the result, determined by political reasons,
would have still been the same, the opinion would have rested on more
solid due process foundations.
Differently from Rule 19, Rule 23211 governing class actions can
hardly be considered a model of due process. Rule 23 was adopted to
allow joinder of parties where such parties’ claims couldn’t be litigated
individually (because of the related costs), or where it would be
impractical to rely on other joinder devices to litigate such claims (because
of the number of individuals with claims to be joined). In other words,
without class actions there would be no way to litigate these claims, either
individually or through standard rules on joinder.212 So conceived, Rule 23
should have required just a simple and elegant joinder analysis, conducive
of the final result of aggregation whenever that would be feasible and fair.
But the Rule now contains a series of narrow and rigid multipart formulas

206

Id.
Id. at 873.
208 Pimentel, 553 U.S. at 864 (“All parties appear to concede [that Rule 19(a) is satisfied
and the] disagreement instead centers around the application of subdivision (b), which
addresses whether the action may proceed without the Republic and the Commission, given
that the Rule requires them to be parties.”).
209 The Court in Pimentel did not assess the plaintiffs’ interests and rights and remedies
available in the case. It held that Merrill Lynch, the stakeholder, and not the Pimentel class,
had to be considered “the plaintiff.” And if the interpleader action was dismissed for
nonjoinder, even if “[t]hat disposition will not provide Merrill Lynch with a judgment
determining the party entitled to the assets . . . it likely would provide Merrill Lynch with
an effective defense against piecemeal litigation and inconsistent, conflicting judgments.”
Id. at 872. Also, “in any later suit against it Merill Lynch may seek to join the Republic
and the Commission and have the action dismissed under Rule 19(b) should they again
assert sovereign immunity.” Id. at 870–71. The Court did not consider the possibility of
shaping the relief (“[n]o alternative remedies or forms of relief have been proposed to us
or appear to be available.”) Id. at 870. And the Court did not assess the interests of the
judicial system as a whole. The Court noted that proceeding without the absent parties
“would not further the public interest in settling the dispute as a whole because the Republic
and the Commission would not be bound by the judgment in an action where they were not
parties.”) Id. at 870–71. But it is hard to see how after two instances of proceeding, the
judicial system would have preferred dismissal over continuance.
210 Id. at 865, 869.
211 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
212 See Simona Grossi, Frontloading, supra note 10.
207
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that make aggregation hard to achieve and at times seem to favor the
party(ies) resisting class certification.213
For an action to be certified as a class, Rule 23(a) provides that there
must be (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy
of representation.214 A class may proceed as such if it meets all the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and falls within one of the three types under
Rule 23(b).215
Under Rule 23(a), the proposed class must be “so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable;”216 there must be “questions of
law or fact common to the class;”217 the claims or defenses of the
representative parties must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the
class;”218 and the representative parties must “fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.”219 Under Rule 23(b), the action should fall into
one of the three “types”220 listed in that rule: “(1) . . . prosecuting separate
actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of (A)
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class;221 or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests;”222 (2) “the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respective the class as a whole;”223 or (3) “the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is

213 For an extensive analysis of Rule 23 and its flaws, see Simona Grossi, Frontloading,
supra note 10. See also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Action, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 729, 776 (2013).
214 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
215 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). The action, though, might also be certified as an “issues class”
under Rule 23(c)(4).
216 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (emphasis added).
217 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (emphasis added).
218 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (emphasis added).
219 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (emphasis added).
220 Rule 23(b) has three subdivisions but provides four types of class actions. This is
because (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) could be considered as separate types; they are treated as
one category, though, as they are both “designed to prevent prejudice to the parties
resulting from multiple suits involving the same subject matter by certifying a mandatory
class.” Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 383, 392 (D.D.C. 2010). One could in fact count five
different types, if Rule 23(c)(4) issue classes were included in the list.
221 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
222 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
223 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
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superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.”224
The (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2) classes are “mandatory,”225
meaning that the Rule does not entitle class members to notice of class
certification or the right to opt out of the class.226 The (b)(3) class,
however, is an “opt-out” class, as class members have the right to notice
of class certification and the right to opt-out of the class.227
The text of the Rule is hyper-technical, also containing provisions on
the “Certification Order; Notice to Class Members; Judgment; Issues
Classes; Subclasses,”228 “Conducting the Action,”229 “Settlement,
Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise,”230 “Appeals,”231 and “Class
Counsel.”232
Because of the technicalities and the several redundancies in the
Rule, when applying it, courts tend to look for something else, something
that would satisfy the redundant requirement and give an independent
meaning to it. In search for this independent meaning, judges often make
ad-hoc, anti-plaintiffs considerations that elevate formality over
substance, frontload the analysis of the merits,233 close the doors of federal

224

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B), and FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(b)(2) with FED. R. CIV. P. 19, FED. R. CIV. P. 22, and FED. R. CIV. P. 24. See also 2
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §4:3 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 5th ed. 2012); Benjamin
Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967) (observing how the similarities
between Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 19 are “not incidental but logical”).
226 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (making notice discretionary in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes,
and containing no reference to the right to opt-out); see also Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (stating that Rule 23 “provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or
(b)(2) class members to opt out”). However, as Robert Klonoff noted, “the Court in Dukes
strongly suggested that, when monetary claims are more than incidental to claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief [in (b)(2) classes], due process requires notice and opt-out
rights. Indeed, the Court hinted that notice and opt-out rights may be required in (b)(2)
actions even where the monetary claims in the case do not predominate.” Robert Klonoff,
Class Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due
Process Require Notice and Opt-Out Rights? 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 809 (2014).
227 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring, in (b)(3) classes, “the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances,” which must also state that “the court will exclude
from the class any member who requests exclusion.”).
228 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
231 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
232 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
233 In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court even suggested that expert witnesses offered for
purposes of certification must be qualified under the Federal Rules of Evidence and after a
full Daubert hearing. 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011).
225
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courts by increasing the procedural hurdles,234 increase the costs of
litigation,235 and ultimately short-circuit the class action joinder
mechanism. 236 As I said, hardly a model of due process.
Rule 26237 governing discovery, although not as fraught with
formalities as Rule 23, has endorsed a mechanical model that might at
some point turn into the Rule 23 model.
Typically, discovery commences after the pleading stage of a
controversy. The original Rules allowed discovery under a “subject
matter” standard. Hence, a party was entitled to discover any
nonprivileged factual material relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.
Thus, the standard, a more generalized one, was not focused on the claim,
but on the subject matter of the suit. This distinction reflected the fact that
the claim was inchoate when discovery commenced since only its broad
nature had to be revealed under the original interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2).
Discovery on the inchoate claim could either broaden or narrow the actual
claim to be litigated.238
The version of Rule 26(b) adopted in 2000 defined the scope of
discovery in terms of information relevant to a “claim or defense,” a
conceptually narrower category than subject matter.239 But if the claim is
234 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Inaugural University Professorship Lecture: Are They
Closing the Courthouse Doors? (Mar. 19, 2012) (www.law.nyu/edu/news/
ECM_PRO_072088) at 7 (“The class certification motion thus has become another
procedural stop sign undermining the utility of one of the most important joinder
mechanisms for handling disputes arising from conduct damaging large numbers of people
with small claims.”).
235 Id. (“If class representatives cannot clear the certification hurdle, as has become
more common, individual actions are not pursued because they are not economically
viable. Even when an attempt to block certification doesn’t succeed, the very elaborate
process created by the courts imposes additional cost and delay, especially when
interlocutory appellate review of certification is sought, let alone granted. Perhaps even
more troublesome is the fact that increased costs and the heightened risk of noncertification inhibits the institution of potentially meritorious cases, leaving public policies
under enforced and large numbers of citizens uncompensated.”). See also Freer, FrontLoading, supra note 7, at 723 (“This front-loading increases the expense of litigating class
certification. More is on the table at an early stage than in prior practice.”).
236 See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal
Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731,
1740 (2014).
237 FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
238 The current approach is less generous. Under Twombly and Iqbal, the claim must be
defended as to each right of action, by aligning the non-conclusory factual allegations with
each element of a specified right. Only after this standard is satisfied will discovery
commence.
239 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the
court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
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a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more rights of action, there
cannot be any matter that, although not relevant to any party’s claim or
defense will be still relevant to the subject matter. Indeed, judges have
noted that the 2000 amendment did not materially alter their task.240 The
goal, however, was to “involve the court more actively in regulating the
breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery.”241
Rule 26(b) was again amended in 2015 to further limit the scope of
discovery, and it now provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.242

The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the amendment explained
that,
[t]he amendment deletes the former provision authorizing the
court, for good cause, to order discovery of any matter relevant to
the subject matter involved in the action. The Committee has been
informed that this language is rarely invoked. Proportional
discovery relevant to any party’s claim or defense suffices, given
a proper understanding of what is relevant to a claim or defense.
The distinction between matter relevant to a claim or defense and
matter relevant to the subject matter was introduced in 2000 . . . .
Discovery that is relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses may
also support amendment of the pleadings to add a new claim or
defense that affects the scope of discovery.243

The new text reads more like a mechanical code provision, and my
fear is that it will generate further litigation over forms and technicalities
and that the proportionality standards will work in tandem with Twombly
and Iqbal to narrow the range of discovery to those rights of action that
action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is
subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”).
240 See, e.g. Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New England, 232 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D.
Conn. 2005); Klein v. AIG Trading Group Inc., 228 F.R.D. 418, 423 (D. Conn. 2005);
Lugosch v. Congel, 218 F.R.D. 41, 45 (N.D. N.Y. 2003).
241 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Committee’s Note (2000).
242 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
243 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) Advisory Committee’s note (2015).
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survive a court’s application of Rule 12(b)(6),244 thus frustrating the
important due process aspirations that discovery is intended to meet.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
When procedural rules and doctrines stray from due process, they
prevent the development and enforcement of substantive rights.
The interpretation and application of the patent law experimental use
exception demanded that the federal court hear the Gunn case. The
development of patent law was thus frustrated by the unjustified denial of
subject matter jurisdiction in that case. Similarly, the denial of personal
jurisdiction in McIntyre prevented the court from engaging in the
assessment of the manufacturer’s liability under the circumstances of the
case and, even more troublesome, essentially evaporated the possibility for
the plaintiff to enforce his rights. The Court did not assess the equal
protection of the laws claim that the plaintiff had filed in Linda R.S., and
in Clapper, it refused to interpret and apply the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). The law of the Sherman Act was not clarified in
Twombly, and the plaintiffs were prevented from trying to enforce their
substantive rights that they “plausibly” believed arose from that Act. The
plaintiff in Iqbal was denied the same possibility, and similar treatment
received the plaintiffs in Pimentel. The mechanical, check-list style of
Rules 23 and 26 might generate similar results.
Many other procedural rules and doctrines cannot be squared with
due process. The findings and reflections of this study are intended to
provide a platform against which to test those rules and doctrines for
purposes of reform, a reform of their text, of their interpretation, and/or of
the way we think about them.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Procedure and law are more deeply intertwined that one might think.
Procedure is the means and method through which substantive law is
enforced and developed. Thus the optimal development of substantive law
requires an optimal procedure which, as I have shown, is a procedure
consistent and informed by due process.
Starting from the fragmented ideas provided by the Supreme Court
over the years, and moving to deeper, more holistic reflections on the
common law and democratic system within which those ideas are
supposed to operate, this study develops a theory of due process that will
hopefully prompt further reflections and support for reform.
244 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Simona Grossi, The Claim, supra
note 10.

